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Abstract: In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s 
distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two 
chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to 
animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two 
kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both 
of these charges. 
 
For over twenty years, Ernest Sosa has been distinguishing between animal and reflective 
knowledge. While the official characterization has shifted,
1
 the basic claims about the distinction 
remain the same, roughly: animal and reflective knowledge are a kind of virtuous/skilled/apt 
performance; reflective knowledge is animal knowledge plus some type of “perspective” on 
one’s belief and its fit with others; reflective knowledge is superior to animal knowledge; and 
reflective knowledge brings about epistemic benefits.  
In On Reflection,
2
 Hilary Kornblith has criticized Sosa’s distinction. In section I of this 
paper, I identify two chief criticisms: (i) reflective knowledge is not superior to animal 
knowledge; and (ii) Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. In section II, I 
argue that both of these charges can be successfully avoided. 
I. Kornblith’s Criticisms 
In this section, I identify two chief criticisms Kornblith has of Sosa’s distinction between 
animal and reflective knowledge.  
First, reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge. Kornblith’s argument is 
this. Reflective knowledge is superior to animal knowledge only if by reflecting we are able to 
arrive at more reliable beliefs.
3
 As Kornblith writes, “The whole point in subjecting one’s beliefs 
to reflective scrutiny… is to increase one’s reliability.”4 But reflection on one’s belief does not 
increase reliability.
5
 Kornblith devotes an entire section to defending this claim, and concludes 
“…there seems little reason to agree with Sosa that reflective knowledge is superior to mere 
animal knowledge in virtue of the additional reliability which reflection provides.”6 So, reflective 
knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge. More schematically: 
(P1) Reflective knowledge is superior to animal knowledge only if reflection produces 
more reliable beliefs. 
(P2) Reflection does not produce more reliable beliefs. 
                                                 
1
 Compare Ernest Sosa, “Descartes and Virtue Epistemology,” in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind, ed. Kelly 
James Clark and Mike Rea, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 121; Sosa, Reflective Knowledge, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2009), 75f.; Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 32; Sosa, “Knowledge 
and Intellectual Virtue,” in his Knowledge in Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19991), 240; 
and Sosa, “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective,” in his Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 278. My concern is mostly with some characterization of this distinction being apt. Fortunately, for the 
most part, my response—and Kornblith’s criticisms—do not rest upon the differences between these different 
formulations.  
2
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). I focus on this presentation since it is his most recent; I’ll draw 
upon previous versions of the criticisms when relevant.  
3
 On Reflection, 16, 18.  
4
 On Reflection, 16.  
5
 On Reflection, 20-6.  
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 On Reflection, 26. 
  
(C1) So, reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge. 
We can identify another criticism: Sosa’s distinction does not identify two different kinds of 
knowledge. Kornblith’s criticism here is closer to a challenge to Sosa to show he has identified 
two different kinds of knowledge than an argument that Sosa has not. Kornblith introduces his 
criticism by way of analogy. He considers a (supposed) distinction between what he calls 
“consultative knowledge”—roughly, knowledge I possess after I consult with a range of friends 
on some matter—and “non-consultative knowledge”—knowledge I possess when I do not 
consult with a range of friends on some matter. Kornblith’s intuition is that, while there might be 
two distinct epistemic states here, there are not two distinct kinds of knowledge.
7
 Further, he 
finds Sosa’s distinction to be analogous to this distinction, writing “it seems to me that the 
distinction between reflective knowledge and animal knowledge is no better grounded than the 
distinction between consultative knowledge and non-consultative knowledge.”8  
One might construe Kornblith as here arguing from analogy, roughly: the distinct between 
consultative and non-consultative knowledge does not identify two kinds of knowledge; Sosa’s 
distinction is analogous to that one; so, Sosa’s distinction does not identity two different kinds of 
knowledge. But this construal does not get Kornblith’s criticism quite right.  
Sosa has labelled two distinct epistemic states as distinct kinds of knowledge. Kornblith is 
challenging why they deserve this label. The consultative knowledge/non-consultative case is 
intended as an illustrative example of two distinct epistemic states that do not deserve to be 
called distinct kinds of knowledge. Without any positive reason for thinking that Sosa’s 
distinction is unlike the consultative/non-consultative distinction (or many others like it that 
could be provided), there is no reason for thinking that Sosa has identified two distinct kinds of 
knowledge. Kornblith’s challenge (as we might call it) is to provide some reason for thinking 
that this distinction identifies two kinds of knowledge.
9
  
Before responding to these two objections, let me mention a third possible objection that 
Kornblith does not clearly separate from the second, namely: Sosa’s distinction is not 
illuminative; it is not a distinction worth drawing. He writes that  
Not every well-defined distinction, however, is worth making. We could define two 
different sorts of knowledge, one sort acquired on even-numbered days of the month, and 
the other acquired on odd-numbered days, but there would be little point in making such 
a distinction. We need to know why the distinction between animal knowledge and 
reflection knowledge is an illuminating one.
10
  
However, as his discussion at that point continues, the criticism shifts to the second criticism, 
that Sosa has not identified two kinds of knowledge, not that the distinction is not worth making 
or is not illuminating.  
It is difficult to identify what argument Kornblith has for this criticism that is distinct from 
the second, because he does not clearly distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, I intend to 
understand him such that this third criticism rests upon the other two—if Sosa’s distinction does 
not identify two kinds of knowledge, and if it does not even pick out a superior epistemic state 
with reflective knowledge, then it is not illuminating or worth drawing. Consequently, because 
I’ll be arguing that the first two criticisms fail, I will not spend any time considering this one.  
II. Responses 
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 On Reflection, 19.  
8
 On Reflection, 19, italics mine. 
9
 Conversation with Luis Oliveira and Keith DeRose was helpful here.  
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 On Reflection, 15-6  
  
In this section I respond to Kornblith’s criticism in reverse order.  
II.1 Sosa’s Distinction Does Not Identify Two Different Kinds Of Knowledge. 
Kornblith’s challenge is to provide some reason for thinking that Sosa’s distinction 
identifies two kinds of knowledge. Sosa can rise to this challenge.  
Sosa is a virtue epistemologist; this means, among other things, that it is a particular 
cognizer and her performances that are central to epistemic evaluation. For Sosa, knowledge is a 
kind of excellence performance of a cognizer.
11
 Thus, for there to be two different kinds of 
knowledge, there would have to be two different kinds of skills that a cognizer can perform. But 
animal knowledge and reflective knowledge involve two different general kinds of skills that a 
cognizer can perform. (At the very least, Kornblith has given us no reason for thinking they are 
not.) So, Kornblith’s challenge can be met: there is a reason for thinking that Sosa has identified 
two different kinds of knowledge. 
Kornblith might object that there is a problem of proliferation here.
12
 For it may seem as if 
this response attempts to meet Kornblith’s challenge by allowing for two epistemic states to be 
different kinds of knowledge if they originated in different kinds of ways. But then “we will have 
as many different kinds of knowledge as there are processes of belief acquisition and retention. 
Surely this multiplies kinds of knowledge far beyond necessity.”13  
But this response avoids this problem of proliferation. For the response is not there is a 
different kind of knowledge for each different way of forming and retaining a belief. The 
suggestion is that there is a different kind of knowledge for different kinds of skills. Further, the 
kind of skill displayed by reflective knowledge can be found across multiple modalities such as 
(e.g.) perception or memory. This kind of skill is thus general in nature. Consequently, it does 
not thereby warrant a proliferation of kinds of knowledge for each way of forming and retaining 
beliefs. Kornblith’s challenge can be met without undue proliferation by understanding 
knowledge as a kind of general skill.
14
 
II.2 Reflective Knowledge Is Not Superior To Animal Knowledge. 
Recall Kornblith’s second criticism: 
(P1) Reflective knowledge is superior to animal knowledge only if reflection produces 
more reliable beliefs. 
(P2) Reflection does not produce more reliable beliefs. 
(C1) So, reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge. 
I press two responses: Kornblith has not done enough to establish (P2), and (P1) is false.
15
  
Kornblith dedicates an entire section of his book to defending (P2). However, his argument 
there does not establish (P2). He spends most of his time defending the thesis that introspective 
scrutiny about belief p is an unreliably way to determine whether or not the particular cognitive 
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 See, inter alia, “Descartes and Virtue Epistemology,” 117; Reflective Knowledge, 135; A Virtue 
Epistemology, 23, 31, 93.  
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 Cf. Kornblith, “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, ed. John Greco, 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 132.  
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 “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” 132; cf. On Reflection, 19.  
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 Kornblith might object that we should conceive of knowledge as a natural kind (see his Knowledge and Its 
Place in Nature, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002)) and not as a skill, and knowledge conceived of in this way would 
not meet Kornblith’s challenge. However, this objection would beg the question against Sosa. Furthermore, it would 
undermine the significance of Kornblith’s criticisms. If one used a different conception of knowledge that Sosa, then 
perhaps some of the things Sosa says about knowledge will come out false—but this would not be particularly 
surprising and it would not be clear how this would be a relevant criticism of Sosa.  
15
 Kornblith considers three possible objections to (P1)—see On Reflection, 26-34—but none are the ones I’ll 
press.  
  
processes that produced p were reliable or due to (e.g.) some anchoring bias. This thesis is 
plausible, given the empirical evidence he cites, and I do not object to it. However, the problem 
is that establishing this thesis as true does not show (P2) is true. (P2) claims that reflection does 
not produce more reliable beliefs. This can be false even when introspection does not give us 
insight into the cognitive processes that produce those beliefs.  
To begin with an analogy, because I am not a mechanic, paying attention to specific ways 
my car runs (e.g. the sounds it makes, how slowly it takes to break, etc.) does not give me any 
insight into the particular mechanics of my car (e.g. what sounds (if any) a crankshaft should be 
making, how my engine or fuel rod works). Nevertheless, paying attention to how my car runs 
can result in it running more reliably, since I might take it to a mechanic when I notice it is not 
running as it usually does. Furthermore, even though I am not a mechanic, I know that there are 
certain things I could do—e.g. filling it with the wrong kind of gas or trying to drive it 
underwater—that would result in it being more unreliable.  
Similarly, there can be multiple ways in which the result of reflection can produce more 
reliable beliefs even though introspection does not give insight into particular cognitive 
processes. For instance, perhaps, by reflecting, I realize that many of the beliefs John has told me 
are actually false or improbable. Upon reflection, this might led me to be more skeptical of 
John’s testimony and thereby avoid error. Or perhaps I read two newspapers each day. By 
reflecting, I might keep myself from holding inconsistent beliefs upon the basis of the two 
newspapers. Indeed, by reflecting on information already available to me, I might realize that 
one of the newspapers is more reliable than the other and adopt a policy of only accepting what it 
says when the two conflict. Further, reflective scrutiny can make our beliefs more reliable in 
indirect ways. For instance, when pressed on a belief, I may not sit back and try to figure out 
what was going on inside my cranium; I may begin to do research and consult with other sources 
on that topic. Such research can increase the reliability of our beliefs.  
To be clear, my purpose here is to undermine, not refute. This handful of examples is not 
intended to refute (P2) and thereby show that reflection does produce more reliable beliefs (how 
could a handful of examples do that?). Rather, I am merely illustrating the many ways in which 
reflection can produce reliable beliefs without utilizing introspection into the cognitive processes 
responsible for our beliefs. This undermines Kornblith’s argument for (P2)—the defender of 
Sosa’s distinction can concede the lousiness of introspection for certain tasks without thereby 
having to concede other positive roles that reflection can play.
16
  
At this point, Kornblith might concede that his argument for (P2) is invalid, but now provide 
a different argument. I’ve conceded that introspection does not provide us particularly good 
insight into the cognitive processes responsible for the formulation of our beliefs. Kornblith 
might argue that that thesis is sufficient to show that we rarely—if ever—have reflective 
knowledge. For (he might argue) to have reflective knowledge, introspection must give us 
insight into the cognitive processes producing beliefs. He might cite Sosa himself: 
One has reflective knowledge if one’s judgment of belief manifests not only such direct 
response to the fact known but also understanding of its place in a wider whole that 
includes one’s belief and knowledge of it and how these come about.17  
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 Of course, defenders of some versions of epistemic internalism may not be able to concede this (see 
Kornblith, Knowledge and Its Place in Nature, chp. 4) for argument that they cannot). But I’m not defending 
epistemic internalism here, but the distinction between reflective and animal knowledge. 
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 “Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue,” 240, italics mine.  
  
But since introspection cannot (or rarely does) provide insight into the cognitive processes that 
produce our beliefs, and reflective knowledge requires it to, there is rarely, if ever, any reflective 
knowledge. (Note that the conclusion of this argument, while formally consistent with there 
being two kinds of knowledge (animal and reflective), is still fairly damning for Sosa’s view. For 
the hope of the distinction is to capture distinct epistemic states that people actually possess with 
some frequency.)  
In response, this new argument assimilates Sosa’s “how these come about” with the 
particular cognitive processes that might be studied by a psychologist or a brain scientist. But 
this assimilation is dubious, and, I think, a poor interpretation of Sosa. As some of the examples 
Sosa provides illustrate,
18
 his “how these come about” is not concerned with one’s particular 
brain state but more general, coarse grained knowledge (acquired through experience) about 
sources of belief (e.g.) newspapers, vision in the rain, hearing when intoxicated, testimony from 
politicians, etc. Reflective knowledge requires one to reflect on these more coarse grained 
origins of one’s beliefs. The empirical studies that Kornblith cites does not show reflection 
cannot do that.  
My second criticism is that there is good reason for rejecting (P1), that reflective knowledge 
is superior to animal knowledge only if reflection produces more reliable beliefs.  The problem 
is, roughly put, this: there are things of epistemic value that reflective scrutiny/knowledge can 
provide (and reliable belief need not) even if reflective scrutiny does not increase reliability. To 
see this, it is important to recall that, for Sosa, reflective knowledge includes seeing how one’s 
belief fits among others. Seeing this brings with it other things of epistemic value both 
individually and communally. Let me briefly motivate each of these points. 
First, seeing how one’s belief fits with others can bring with it coherence, understanding, 
and explanation.
19
 For instance, by reflecting on one’s beliefs and seeing how they fit together, 
one can reveal inconsistencies and expunge them—even if (as can occur) the original sources of 
the conflicting beliefs are highly reliable.
20
 Thus, reflection can increase coherence (and truth 
over error) even if one’s belief all originated in highly reliable sources.21 Further, by reflecting, 
one can see the necessity of seeking out multiple sources on some matter (e.g. an event), even if 
one’s initial source was highly reliable. (After all, that initial source, while being highly reliable 
and not containing any errors, might nevertheless fail to include important information or over-
emphasize other information.) Thus, reflection can increase understanding, even if one’s initial 
beliefs originated in a highly reliable source. Finally, due to an increase in understanding, one 
can gain an increase in explanation. To explain something is to answer a why-question by 
picking out, from a range of information, the relevant information. By possessing reflective 
knowledge, one can better understand what piece of information is relevant for answering a why-
question, even if that reflective knowledge does not (on its own) produce other reliably formed 
beliefs.  
Second, seeing how one’s beliefs fit with others can play a role in the spread of truth among 
a community. As Sosa correctly points out,
 22
 knowledge occurs in a community. Part of the 
transmission of knowledge in a community may require more than mere animal belief. For 
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 For instance, the example immediately following the cited passage above in “Knowledge and Intellectual 
Virtue,” 241; cf. “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective,” 278.  
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 Sosa, Reflective Knowledge, 137. 
20
 Note that this is not the same as merely updating one’s beliefs as one receives new information, but 
reflection on one’s beliefs without necessarily receiving new information.  
21
 Cf. Sosa, “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective,” 291-2.  
22
 See, e.g., A Virtue Epistemology, 93ff.; “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective,” 275.  
  
instance, in academic and theoretical communities more generally, merely reliably formed belief 
is not sufficient—one needs to argue, explain, and provide coherent accounts of things. For 
instance, even if a new invention (e.g. the telescope) or a new model (e.g. of weather patterns) is 
reliable, a theoretical community may initially regard it with skepticism; in such a case, a theorist 
may have a great deal of animal knowledge, but more is required for the spread of knowledge 
among that community.
23
 So, reflective knowledge can be superior to animal knowledge by 
bringing about other things of epistemic value besides reliability.  
I do not belabor these points because I doubt that Kornblith disagrees. At one point,
24
 he 
considers a specific scenario with two people, A and B, where the former has animal knowledge 
that p and the latter reflective knowledge that p. He concedes that, in the scenario, “reflection has 
produced epistemic benefits. It has, on this occasion, improved B’s epistemic situation. I 
certainly do not wish to deny that this kind of thing can occur.”25 But if Kornblith does not deny 
that reflective knowledge, partly due to reflection, brings about all these epistemic benefits 
animal knowledge can lack, why does he assert (P1): reflective knowledge is superior to animal 
knowledge only if reflection produces more reliable beliefs? 
The answer lies in what he says next: 
How does having reflective knowledge that p put one in a better epistemic situation with 
respect to p? Thus far, the epistemic benefits we have noted in B’s situation have to do 
with her knowing many other things in addition to p, but this, by itself, does not clearly 
show that her knowledge that p is in any respect superior to A’s knowledge that p… For 
all that has been said, A’s belief that p may have been produced by a far more reliable 
process than B’s, even when we include the effects of B’s reflection has on the overall 
reliability of the way in which she arrived at her belief that p.
26
  
On Kornblith’s view, then, there are many things that a set of beliefs can have that are of 
epistemic benefit—e.g. reliability, coherence, understanding, etc.—but that when determining 
the epistemic superiority of a single belief, only one of those benefits, namely reliability, is 
relevant. In this way, he can concede that reflective knowledge can bring about epistemic values 
to sets of beliefs while still holding that for any particular belief that counts as reflective 
knowledge it is superior to its animal knowledge counterpart only if it was produced by a more 
reliable process.  
There are two problems with this view. First, this looks like special pleading, and we need 
some principled reason why reliability is singled out. It would be one thing to claim that 
coherence, explanation, and understanding are not of any epistemic value.
27
 But to claim that 
they are, but not relevant to determining the epistemic superiority of a single belief, is ad hoc. 
Second, there are counterexamples to the idea that only reliability is relevant to determining 
the epistemic superiority of a belief. Suppose that A’s belief that p is knowledge, and originates 
in a highly reliable source. Suppose, further, that B’s belief that q originates in an even more 
reliable source, but that on this occasion, B’s belief has been “gettierized,” so that B’s belief that 
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 Jacob Caton suggested to me that perhaps Kornblith might think that these things of epistemic value can be 
“reduced” to reliability. Note that this suggestion, though, would amount to giving up (P2). For if reflective 
knowledge brought about these things of epistemic value, and those reduce just to reliability, then reflection would 
produce more reliable beliefs.  
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 “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” 131.  
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 “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” 131.  
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 “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge,” 131.  
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 Again, one might try to “reduce” these values to reliability, but as pointed out in fn. 23, this would be just to 
give up the second premise of the argument.  
  
q is mere justified true belief. Despite the fact that B’s belief q originated in a more reliable 
process than A’s belief that p, A’s belief—constituting knowledge—is epistemic superior to B’s 
belief, which does not constitute knowledge. So it cannot be that only reliability is relevant to 
determining the epistemic superiority of a belief. So, independent of worries about ad hocery, 
this view is false. Sosa’s distinction still stands.28 
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